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Abstract
Income expectations play a central role in household
decision making. In the life cycle model for example, con-
sumption and savings decisions reﬂect expectations of fu-
ture income. In empirical applications where direct in-
formation on expectations is not available, it is usually
assumed that expectations are rational, and reﬂected by
observed future realizations. In this paper, we analyze di-
rect subjective information on expected changes of house-
hold income in one panel wave of Dutch families. First,
w ed e s c r i b et h e s ed a t aa n di n v e s t i g a t eh o wt h ee x p e c t a -
tions can be explained by, among other variables, income
changes in the past. Second, we combine these data with
information on realized income changes in the next panel
wave, and analyze the diﬀerences between expected and
realized changes. We ﬁnd that, on average, households un-
derestimate their future income changes signiﬁcantly. In
particular, this holds for those families whose income has
f a l l e ni nt h ep a s t .
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1 Introduction
In the dynamic process of household decision making, future expectations
play a central role. In a life cycle framework, decisions on current consump-
tion of nondurables and durables, housing, savings, portfolio choice, labor
supply, etc., not only depend on current wealth, income and preferences, but
also on the individual’s or household’s subjective distribution of family in-
come, prices, and other input variables [see, for example, Deaton (1992)]. In
most of the empirical literature on life cycle models, no direct information on
future expectations is used. To quote Dominitz and Manski (1994): ”Skepti-
cal of subjective data of all kinds, economists do not ordinarily collect data
on income expectations. Instead, the standard approach is to infer expecta-
tions from panel data on realizations.” 1 To estimate the life cycle model, it is
then assumed that individuals’ subjective expectations bear some relation to
income realizations. This leads to the assumption of rational expectations,
or to some alternative explicit model of expectation formation, estimated on
the basis of realized incomes. 2
Notable recent exceptions to this approach are, for example, Guiso et al.
(1992, 1996), Lusardi (1993), and Alessie and Lusardi (1993). In these pa-
pers, characteristics of subjective income distributions directly derived from
survey data, are used as explanatory variables to explain consumption, sav-
ings or portfolio choice. In line with this, interest in data on and the mod-
elling of income expectations has increased. See Guiso et al. (1992), Dominitz
and Manski (1994), and Alessie et al. (1994a). 3 The former two analyze
data on subjective income distributions on the basis of a cross-section. They
do not compare income expectations with income realizations. The latter
use panel data and show that expected changes in income are signiﬁcantly
correlated with actual income changes.
Our approach is in line with Dominitz and Manski (1994) and Alessie
et al. (1994a). We do not analyze consumption or savings, but focus on
income expectations and realizations. We use the same subjective data on
actual and expected income changes as Alessie et al. (1994a), drawn from
the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP). These questions are:
1See, for example, Hall and Mishkin (1982) and other references in Dominitz and
Manski (1994).
2For example, Carroll (1994) uses two methods for estimating future income of indi-
viduals participating in the 1960-1961 Consumer Expenditures Survey (CEX). In the ﬁrst
method, he estimates age/income cross-sectional proﬁles using household characteristics.
A particular household’s expected future income is then assumed to be given by the aver-
age observed income of older households with similar characteristics. The second method
regresses actual 1969-1985 income on 1968 personal characteristics using data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
3Carroll et al. (1994) use a macro-economic measure of economic prospects, the Index
of Consumer Sentiment, and ﬁnd that it positively aﬀects consumer spending.2
A: Did your household’s income increase, decrease, or remain un-
changed during the past twelve months? Possible answers: strong
decrease (1); decrease (2); no change (3); increase (4); strong in-
crease (5).
B: What will happen to your household’s income in the next twelve
months? Possible answers: see A.
These questions are not very well speciﬁed. It is not clear whether nomi-
nal or real income is referred to, and it is not clear what distinguishes strong
increases from increases, etc. We will come back to this in section 4. The
value of the questions is the fact that they are comparable: it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the household has the same concepts in mind while
answering questions A and B. Moreover, these questions have been asked at
each wave of the panel, and it is possible to compare the expectation (B) in
one year to the realization (A) the next year. In case of rational expecta-
tions and in the absence of macro-economic shocks, the distributions of these
two should be similar. If not, then this would be evidence against crucial as-
sumptions underlying the empirical work on life-cycle models: either rational
expectations, or the absence of macro-economic shocks, or both.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the
data, drawn from the SEP wave of October 1984. We describe the data
on income change expectations (answers to question B) and present some
nonparametric regressions of these expectations on age and actual income,
used to suggest appropriate parametric models. In section 3, we estimate
an ordered response model explaining expected income changes from income
changes in the past (question A), the level of actual income, and other back-
ground variables, such as age, family composition, and labor market status.
In section 4, we compare the expectations (question B) in 1984 with the re-
alizations (question A) in 1985 of the same households, exploiting the panel
nature of the SEP data. We investigate to what extent people systematically
under- or overestimate their income changes. For this purpose, we consider
an ordered response model explaining the diﬀerence between realization and
expectation, using the same explanatory variables as in section 3. At the end
of the section we brieﬂy comment on the validity of rational expectations and
t h ep r e s e n c eo fm a c r o - e c o n o m i cs h o c k s .I ns e c t i o n5 ,w es u m m a r i z eo u rﬁnd-
ings.
2 Description of the data
Data were taken from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) which is ad-
ministered by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The SEP is a random sample
of the Dutch population, excluding those living in special institutions like3
nursing homes. 4
For this section, we use the wave of October 1984 to elicit information on
expected future income changes. Heads of households are asked to answer
question B (see section 1). The answer to this question will be denoted by
INCEXP. This diﬀers from the way in which Dominitz and Manski (1994)
collected their data. Their income-expectations questions took the form:
”What do you think is the percent chance (or what are the chances out of
100) that your total household income, before taxes, will be less than Y over
the next 12 months?”. With the responses to a sequence of such questions for
diﬀerent values of Y, Dominitz and Manski (1994) estimate each respondent’s
subjective probability distribution for the next year’s household income.
Dominitz and Manski compare their study with that of Guiso et al.
(1992). Guiso et al. asked households to attribute weights, summing up
to 100, to given intervals of nominal earnings percentage increases one year
ahead. Carroll (1994), however, argues that it is clear that many house-
holds did not understand the survey question since a very large proportion
of households reported point expectations for the next year’s income: in the
survey used by Guiso et al. 34% of the households reported a degenerate sub-
jective distribution. Carroll (1994) also notes that a substantial proportion
of the population reported point expectations for the aggregate inﬂation rate.
Though some households may know in advance what their household income
will be, they cannot know with certainty what the aggregate inﬂation rate
would be. Thus the case that households did not understand the question
is fairly strong. Lusardi (1993) explains the point expectations arguing that
with a one-year time horizon, people may attribute non-negligible weights
to a much smaller set of events than when considering the entire period of
life until retirement. With a short time horizon, it is therefore not surprising
that many households know with certainty their future nominal income.
The nature of our data does not allow us to estimate complete subjective
probability distributions of respondents, and this is not what we aim at.
We interpret INCEXP as an indicator that is positively correlated with the
location of the subjective future income distribution. We try to explain
diﬀerences in INCEXP across families from a number of variables. One of
them is related to an income change in the past: the answer to question A
(see section 1), which will be represented by the variable PREV 84.
The original SEP data set contains 3787 households. Since we use actual
household income as an explanatory variable, we removed all households for
which at least one component of household income was missing. In partic-
ular, this implied removing most households with self-employed members,
who usually did not provide reliable information on their incomes. We also
removed a few observations with missing information on other explanatory
variables. This reduced the data set to 2729 observations. Removing obser-
4See CBS (1991) for details about contents, setup, and organization of the SEP.4
vations for which INCEXP or PREV 84 was missing, ﬁnally lead to a total
number of 2683 households.
In Table 1 we display a bivariate frequency table of INCEXP and PREV 84.
Note that both variables refer to income changes, not to income levels.
INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Most of the households (50.3 percent) do not expect their current income
to change. This is in line with Dominitz and Manski (1994), who ﬁnd that
realized household income is the dominant predictor of expected future house-
hold income. More striking is that about 39.0% expect an income decrease,
while only 10.7% expect an income increase. 5 To a lesser extent, the same is
true for the realized household income in the previous twelve months (36.3%
and 12.1%, respectively). 55.4% of the households expect that the change in
income this year will fall in the same category as it fell last year. Finally,
note that the dispersion in expected income changes is much smaller than in
realized income changes. In particular, the number of families expecting a
change is about the same as the number of families which have experienced
a change, but there are few households who expect a large increase or a large
decrease. In terms of expected income levels, this suggests that the expected
level is determined by the current level and an (incomplete) adjustment in
the direction of last year’s change. This seems an important reﬁnement of
Dominitz and Manski’s ﬁnding, who only use information on income levels
and not on income changes.
To suggest and motivate appropriate parametric models, we present some
nonparametric regressions of INCEXP on age and actual after tax family
income. 6
INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE
5Similar results are obtained using a diﬀerent data source: according to the CBS (1993),
the fraction of families in 1984 expecting that their ﬁnancial situation will worsen, is about
20 percent points higher than the fraction expecting an improvement.
6We used the quartic kernel. For the bandwidth, we used 8.0i nF i g u r e1 and Figure 3,
and 1.0 in Figure 2 and Figure 4. For more details on nonparametric regression we refer
to H¨ ardle and Linton (1994).5
In Figure 1 the nonparametric regression of income expectation on age is
displayed. We see that heads of households, on average, more often expect
a fall in income growth when they are older. This pattern changes at the
age of (approximately) 60 years. After this age, many people retire and live
from some, often predetermined, retirement beneﬁts. This pattern appears
to be similar to that of realized income changes: the fraction of people whose
actual income declines does increase with age, until retirement age. This is
similar to the U.S. experience.
INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE
In Figure 2 the nonparametric regression of income expectation on the
logarithm of the net income level is plotted (for details on the computation of
the net income level, we refer to the Appendix). Due to the small number of
households receiving a very low income (less than 10,000 Dutch guilders per
year) the ﬁrst part of the regression line is very inaccurate. 7 For households
with an income above 10,000 Dutch guilders, we see a positive relationship
between income expectation and the logarithm of net income: the lower the
income, the more often the head of the household expects a fall in family
income growth. This corresponds to the increasing inequality of the Dutch
income distribution in the time period concerned.8
3 A model for expected income changes
Since INCEXP is a discrete variable with a natural ordering (from 1, strong
income decrease expected, to 5, strong increase), we model it with an ordered
probit model:
y∗
i = xiβ +  i,
yi = j if mj−1 ≤ y∗
i <m j (j =1 ,...,5). (1)
Here y∗
i is an unobserved variable, and yi, INCEXP of family i, is its observed
counterpart; xi is a row vector of family characteristics, including actual
income and dummy variables for the possible outcomes of PREV 84, the
income change in the past. See Table 2 for the included variables and Tables
A1 and A2 in the Appendix for deﬁnitions and summary statistics of these
variables.  i is the error term. It is assumed that, conditional upon xi,i t
follows a standard normal distribution (with zero mean and unit variance, due
7To be precise, 2.6% of the households receive an annual net income less than 10,000
Dutch guilders.
8CBS (1994) reports a slight increase of the Theil coeﬃcient. Income deciles reported
by Alessie et al. (1994b) reveal a substantial increase of inequality.6
to normalization). The bounds satisfy m0 = −∞, m1 = 0 (by normalization),
m5 = ∞; m2 <m 3 <m 4 and β are the parameters to be estimated.
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. Results are presented in
Table 2. As expected from Table 1, those who experienced a strong income
decrease (PREV84 1 = 1) or a decrease (PREV84 2 = 1) in the past twelve
months, have signiﬁcantly 9 less optimistic income change expectations than
the reference group of those who have not experienced a change. Those
who have experienced a strong fall are more pessimistic than those with a
moderate fall. Similarly, those who have experienced an income gain are
more optimistic than the reference group. A likelihood ratio test cannot
reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on PREV84 4 and PREV84 5a r e
identical.
INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Sex of the head of the household appears to play no role. A quadratic
age pattern has been included, as suggested by Figure 1. INCEXP decreases
until about 58 years of age (ceteris paribus). This could be a cohort eﬀect as
well as a true age eﬀect. The relatively optimistic view of young people could
be explained by the fact that earnings increases are usually much larger in
the beginning of the working career. For pensioners, income is usually quite
stable, which explains the increase for the elderly.
The variables DSELF ... DOTH refer to the labor market status of the
head of the household. The reference group consists of the employees. They
are somewhat less optimistic than the self-employed or company directors.
Those on unemployment beneﬁts, unemployment assistance, or disability
beneﬁts, are signiﬁcantly more pessimistic about future income changes than
employees. In particular, the disabled often expect an income decrease. This
can be explained by the fact that the Dutch system of disability beneﬁts went
through a substantial reform, which was completed in 1987, but was initiated
earlier. In 1985, disability beneﬁts decreased from 80 percent to 70 percent
of the gross wage in the last job. As a result, the after tax replacement ratio
for those on disability beneﬁts decreased from 81.3p e r c e n ti n1 9 8 3t o7 8 .2
percent in 1984, 72.1 percent in 1985, and 71.3 percent in 1986 [see Aarts
and De Jong (1990, p. 39)].
The ﬁnal three explanatory variables capture family composition and la-
bor market status of the spouse. The reference group consists of one earner
households. Expectations of singles or single parents do not diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly from the expectations of one earner households. Heads of two earner
9Throughout, we use a (two-sided) signiﬁcance level of ﬁve percent.7
households, however, signiﬁcantly more often expect a fall in family income.
This may reﬂect the fact the wife may consider to stop working. A similar
eﬀect is found by Dominitz and Manski (1994). We also considered including
variables referring to the presence of children in various age groups, but these
appeared to have very low signiﬁcance levels. 10
In Table 3, we present 95 % conﬁdence intervals for the probabilities that
some reference heads of households expect an income decrease (INCEXP
< 3) or an income increase (INCEXP > 3). The ﬁrst reference case is a male
employee, head of a one earner family, with average age and income level. We
look at the impact of the income change in the past twelve months. Second,
we consider a disabled head of household.
INSERT TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE
The eﬀect of PREV 84 appears to be quite strong. Those employed men
who have experienced a serious income fall, expect another income fall with
probability of at least 60 percent, while their probability of expecting a fu-
ture income increase is quite small. The reference employees whose income
has increased, expect a decrease with probability less than 27 percent, and
expect an increase with probability at least 10 percent. The disabled heads
more often expect an income fall and less often expect an income rise. In
most cases, their conﬁdence intervals do not overlap with those of the corre-
sponding employee.
4 Link to realized income changes
In this section we compare the expected income changes to the realized in-
come changes of the same individuals in the same time period. For this pur-
pose, we use the next wave of the SEP. Assuming that no macro-economic
shocks have taken place, this gives us an indication to what extent people
systematically under- or overestimate their income changes.
Since the SEP is an unbalanced panel, some of the households that were
present in the October wave of 1984, are missing in the October wave of 1985.
From the 2683 households we used in the previous analysis, 498 households
left the panel. Six of the remaining households did not provide information
on their realized income changes. This results in a total of 2179 households of
which both expected and realized income changes are available. We estimated
10Results of, for example, Kapteyn et al. (1988) suggest that heads of households tend
to take little account of the contribution of children’s earnings to household income.8
the ordered probit model in the previous section again, but now with these
2179 households. This yielded almost the same results. That is, the same
parameters were signiﬁcant and all these signiﬁcant parameters had the same
sign. This suggests that the attrition does not lead to serious selectivity
problems.
From the October wave of 1985 we take the answer to the question: ”Did
your household’s income increase, decrease, or remain unchanged during the
past twelve months?”. The answer is denoted by PREV 85, which is com-
parable with PREV 84. Since we have numerical data on realized income
in both 1984 and 1985, we can also calculate the actual income change and
compare this with the subjective measure PREV 85. In Table 4 the median
11 of the actual change in income between 1984 and 1985 is presented for
each outcome of PREV 85. The ﬁrst column is in nominal terms, while the
second column corrects for inﬂation (2.5% ) .
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The results suggest that respondents base their answers on PREV 85
on real income changes rather than nominal income changes. Moreover,
respondents are not symmetric in the sense that an increase in household
income has to be larger than a decrease in household income to be considered
as strong or moderate (in absolute value). If respondents provide income
change expectations using the same scale, these results can also be used to
interpret the values of INCEXP.
As before, we can look at a bivariate frequency table to get some ﬁrst in-
formation on the relationship between expected income changes (INCEXP)
and realized income changes (PREV 85). This is done in Table 5. About
23.2% of the households experienced a decrease in household income, while
t h ei n c o m eo f2 0 .3% of the households increased. When we compare the
(univariate) frequencies of PREV 85 (Table 5) with those of PREV 84 (Ta-
ble 1), we see a shift to the right. This means that, on average, PREV 85
is higher than PREV 84. For 49.6% of the households the expected and
realized income changes are the same. Most of them neither expected nor
experienced an income change. The dispersion in expected income changes
is (again) much smaller than in realized income changes (see also Table 1).
11We use the median instead of the mean because the median is less sensitive for some
outliers.9
INSERT TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE
It seems reasonable to assume that the head of the household has the
same concepts in mind while answering questions on INCEXP and PREV 85.
Therefore, if the value of INCEXP is greater than the corresponding value of
PREV 85, then the head of the household has overestimated future house-
hold income growth. Analogously, if the value of INCEXP is smaller than
PREV 85, then income growth has been underestimated. From Table 5,
it follows that 15.5% of the households overestimated their future income
growth. On the other hand, 34.9% of the households underestimated their
future income growth. From this, it is obvious that, on average, people
signiﬁcantly underestimate their income growth. 12
It would be interesting to know what can explain, and to what extent, the
fact that, on average, people underestimate their income growth. For this
purpose we construct the variable DEV which denotes the deviation between
realized and expected income change: PREV 85 − INCEXP. Note that this
variable can in principle vary from −4 to 4. However, as can be seen from
Table 5, no observations are in the category corresponding to −4. Therefore
DEV only takes the values −3 to 4. A negative value of DEV corresponds
with overestimation and a positive value corresponds with underestimation.
To see how the age of the head of the household or the logarithm of net
household income inﬂuence DEV, we regress DEV (nonparametrically) on
these two variables. The results are displayed in Figures 3 and 4.
INSERT FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE
INSERT FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE
12This is conﬁrmed by a simple conditional sign test. Out of the 1096 observations with
some deviation between expected and actual change, only 336 overestimated their future
income change. This leads to a value of the test statistic of −12.8, exceeding the 97.5
percent critical value of the standard normal.10
In both ﬁgures we see hardly any evidence that age or net household
income can explain the diﬀerence between realized and expected income
change. This implies that the decreasing income change expectations with
age and income in Figures 1 and 2 correspond to a similar decreasing pattern
with age and income in actual income changes. The two compensate each
other, leading to the ﬂat patterns in Figures 3 and 4. We decided to main-
tain the quadratic speciﬁcation that we used in the ordered probit model of
section 3 in the model that explains DEV.
To explain DEV, consider an ordered response model [see equation (1)]
with the same explanatory variables as in section 3 (Table 2). This yields
the following results:11
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
We see in Table 6 that most of the parameters corresponding to the ex-
planatory variables are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. The most important
factor is the income change in the past (reported in October 1984, PREV 84).
Especially when income has fallen in the past, people tend to underestimate
their future income growth. Compared to those who have experienced no in-
come change in the past, those whose income has increased in the past, have
a smaller tendency to underestimate future income growth. The diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant for those who experienced a small increase, but not for those who
experienced a large increase.
Compared to employees, disabled persons appear to have less tendency to
underestimate their future income changes. The explanation could be that
some of the disabled did not anticipate the reduction of disability beneﬁts in
1985 (see previous section), even though, according to the results in section
3, many people did.
As in section 3 we present 95% conﬁdence intervals for the probabilities
that some reference heads of households overestimate (DEV < 0) or under-
estimate (DEV > 0) their future income growth for diﬀerent values of the
income change in the past twelve months (PREV 84). These conﬁdence
intervals are displayed in Table 7.
INSERT TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE
We see in Table 7 that especially for those whose income has fallen in
the past, the probability of underestimating future income growth is quite
high. Given a past (strong) decrease in income for the employed man, the
probability of underestimating is signiﬁcantly higher than the probability of
overestimating future income growth. In the case of a past (strong) increase
in income, the null-hypothesis Po = Pu cannot be rejected. For the disabled
men, we cannot conclude that they have a higher probability of underesti-
mating future income growth. When we compare the conﬁdence intervals for
a disabled male head of household with those of the employed male head,
we see that the intervals for the probability of overestimating future income
growth are slightly shifted to the right and the intervals for the probability
of underestimating future income growth are slightly shifted to the left. The
intervals overlap to a large extent, however.12
Macro-economic shocks and rational expectations
The common approach in the majority of empirical studies on life cycle mod-
els for household behavior, is to assume that the distribution of actual income
changes and the distribution of expected income changes coincide. Our data
show that this assumption is not realistic. Various explanations for this are
possible. The ﬁrst is an unanticipated positive macro-economic shock that
may have taken place in 1985. This is in line with predictions and realiza-
tions of unemployment. In 1984, the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau
expected unemployment to change from 820,000 in 1984 to 830,000 in 1985.
In reality however, unemployment fell in 1985 to 760,000 [see CPB (1986,
Table IV.1) and CPB (1984, p. 22)]. Under- or overestimation of disposable
income level for employees is less unambiguous. Both in nominal and in real
terms, the predicted wage increase is close to the realized increase [see CPB
(1984, Table IV.6) and CPB (1985, Table III.4)].
This suggests that at least part of the underestimation could be explained
by a macro shock. On the other hand, it then seems hard to understand why
there are substantial diﬀerences between various groups. In particular, a
macro shock cannot explain our ﬁnding that those who have experienced an
income decrease in the past, underestimate their future income growth much
more often than others: we cannot think of a good reason why the impact of
macro-economic shocks would be correlated with the income change in the
past (conditional on other characteristics, such as actual income, age, and
employment status). 13
A second explanation is that some groups of people are simply too pes-
simistic, on average. This means that the rational expectations hypothesis
is rejected. 14 This could be an additional explanation why people save more
than the standard life cycle predicts. It seems related to the well-known
precautionary savings motive [cf. Kimball (1990)], but it is very diﬀerent:
according to the precautionary savings motive, people have rational expec-
tations, but are prudent. As a consequence, they save extra if their income
uncertainty is high. Our ﬁndings seem to suggest that particularly those
who experienced an income decrease in the past, have too pessimistic future
expectations.
To check the robustness of this result, we estimated the same model for
deviations between expectations and realizations, but then using the panel
waves of 1985 and 1986. Compared to Table 5, the pattern for these years
13The ﬁnding that the deviation between expected and actual income change in 1985
depends on the actual income change in 1984, is also conﬁrmed by a likelihood ratio
test, obtained by comparing our model with a restricted ordered probit model in which
PREV84 1, ..., PREV84 5 are excluded. (The value of the test statistic was 44.2, exceed-
ing χ2
4;0.05 =9 .49.)
14Using completely diﬀerent data and methods, Hey (1994) also ﬁnds evidence against
the rational expectations hypothesis.13
is similar, but less extreme: 15.7% overestimated and 28.9% underestimated
their 1986 income change (again, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence). The main ﬁnding
is that, as in Table 6, the impact of the dummy variables indicating that
the household experienced a decrease in the past, is signiﬁcantly positive.15
This is at odds with the rational expectations hypothesis. Although macro-
economic shocks could explain why people on average underestimate future
income growth, they cannot explain why those whose income has decreased
more often underestimate than others.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have analyzed information on future income expectations of Dutch house-
holds. We used data on more than 2,000 households in the SEP, with in-
formation on realized income change in 1984, expected income change in
1985, 16 and, from the next panel wave, realized income in 1985. We have
started with an analysis of the discrete variable concerning expected income
changes. Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that about half of the population does not ex-
pect any change. This implies that the current income level is a dominant
predictor of the future income level, a result earlier found by Dominitz and
Manski (1994). Second, we ﬁnd that many more people expect an income
decrease than an income increase. To a large extent, this can be explained
from the past: the realized income change in 1984 appears to have a very
strong impact on the expected income change in 1985, although large ex-
pected changes are rare, even for those who experienced large changes in the
past. Third, we ﬁnd a positive correlation between actual income level and
expected income change. The rich more often expect to get richer, the poor
more often expect to get poorer. The tendency to expect an income fall tends
to increase with age, until close to retirement. Finally, labor market status
of head of household and spouse are also signiﬁcant. For example, disabled
heads more often expect an income fall than others, anticipating the reform
of the disability beneﬁts system, which was initiated in 1985.
In the second part of the paper, we compare realized income changes for
1985 with expected income changes for 1985. We ﬁrst ﬁnd that realizations
are substantially better than expectations, on average. Secondly, we focus on
the deviation between realization and expectation and ﬁnd that particularly
those who experienced an income loss in 1984, tend to underestimate their
income growth in 1985. The ﬁr s tr e s u l tm a yw e l lb ee x p l a i n e df r o ma n
unanticipated macro-economic shock in 1985. The second result, however,
is hard to explain from a macro-economic shock and could be interpreted
15To save space, we do not present the full results. These are available upon request
from the authors.
16To be precise, 1984 (1985) here means from October 1983 (1984) to October 1984
(1985) (the time of the interview).14
as evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis. This same result
is also found when comparing expectations for 1986 reported in 1985 with
realizations in 1986.
Whether this explanation is indeed correct, should be further investigated
by considering more years. If systematic deviations between expectations and
realizations are persistent over a long period of time, macro-economic shocks
can be excluded, and rational expectations would be rejected. Further work
in this direction is on our research agenda.15
Appendix
Table A1: reference list variables.
INCEXP Answer to the question : ”What will happen to your house-
hold’s income in the next twelve months ?” Possible answers
are: strong decrease (1); decrease (2); no change (3); in-
crease (4); strong increase (5).
PREV 84 Answer to the question : ”Did your household’s income in-
crease, decrease, or remain unchanged during the past twelve
months ?” Possible answers: see INCEXP.
This variable is in the analysis also represented as dummy-
variables: PREV84 i = 1 if PREV 84 = i;0o t h e r w i s e
(i =1 ,...,5).
SEX Sex head of household: 1 = male; 2 = female.
AGE Age head of household in tens of years.
LOG INC Natural logarithm of net household income where net house-
hold income is in tens of thousands (per year). The survey
contains accurate information on income from about twenty
potential sources for each individual. After tax household
income was constructed by adding up all income compo-
nents of all family members and some speciﬁch o u s e h o l d
components.
Dummy-variables corresponding to social economic category:
DSELF 1i fh e a do fh o u s e h o l di ss e l f - e m p l o y e d ;0o t h e r w i s e .
DDIR 1 if head of household is director of AInc. or BLtd; 0 other-
wise.
DEMP 1i fh e a do fh o u s e h o l di se m p l o y e d ;0o t h e r w i s e .
DUNEM 1i fh e a do fh o u s e h o l di su n e m p l o y e d ;0o t h e r w i s e .
DRET 1i fh e a do fh o u s e h o l di sr e t i r e d ;0o t h e r w i s e .
DDIS 1i fh e a do fh o u s e h o l di sd i s a b l e d ;0o t h e r w i s e .
DSOCS 1 if head of household is person on social security; 0 other-
wise.
DOTH 1 corresponds with other persons than above mentioned
without profession; 0 otherwise.
Note: DSELF +...+D O T H=1 .
Dummy-variables corresponding to family composition and labor market sta-
tus of spouse:
DSINGLE 1i fh e a do fh o u s e h o l di ss i n g l e ;0o t h e r w i s e .
DSINGLEP 1i fh e a do fh o u s e h o l di ss i n g l ep a r e n t ;0o t h e r w i s e .
DONE 1i fh o u s e h o l di sas i n g l e - e a r n e rh o u s e h o l d ;0o t h e r w i s e .16
DTWO 1 if household is a two-earner household; 0 otherwise.
Note: DSINGLE +...+D T W O=1 .
Table A2: summary statistics.
Variable Nr. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
INCEXP 2683 2.66 0.76 1 5
PREV 84 2683 2.67 0.90 1 5
PREV 85 2179 2.93 0.88 1 5
SEX 2683 1.20 1 2
Age head of household 2683 46.6 17.0 18 89
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1 3.01 .01 .60 .10 .1 5.9
2 5.41 5 .11 1 .50 .70 .5 33.1
3 2.77 .63 3 .84 .81 .4 50.3
4 0.60 .94 .53 .41 .0 10.3
5 0.00 .10 .10 .10 .1 0.4




PREV84 1 −0.975 −12.9
PREV84 2 −0.667 −12.2
PREV84 4 0.694 8.55




LOG INC 3.E-4 0.01














log-likelihood −2647.7Table 3 : 95 %c o n ﬁdence intervals for the probability of
an expected decrease of income and the probability of an
expected increase of income as a function of PREV 84.
Employed man
probability of an probability of an
PREV 84 expected (strong) decrease expected (strong) increase
lower upper lower upper
1 0.600 0.749 0.006 0.020
2 0.483 0.636 0.015 0.039
3 0.238 0.376 0.064 0.139
4 0.073 0.168 0.189 0.367
5 0.103 0.263 0.115 0.296
Disabled man
probability of an probability of an
PREV 84 expected (strong) decrease expected (strong) increase
lower upper lower upper
1 0.801 0.901 0.001 0.004
2 0.702 0.839 0.002 0.010
3 0.441 0.631 0.015 0.049
4 0.189 0.375 0.064 0.180
5 0.246 0.500 0.033 0.132
Note: conﬁdence intervals are calculated for P[ INCEXP ∈ {1,2 }| ˜ x ]a n d
P[ INCEXP ∈ {4, 5}| ˜ x ]w h e r e˜ x is the vector of explanatory variables
evaluated at some speciﬁcv a l u e s : t h em e a no fA G Ea n dL O GINC,
DSINGLE = 0, DSINGLEP = 0 and DTWO = 0 (so this implies a head
of the household who is a single-earner).Table 4 : Median of actual nominal and real income
change (in %) for each outcome of PREV 85.
PREV 85 nominal change (in %) real change (in %)
1: strong decrease -3.49 -5.85
2: decrease 1.18 -1.28
3: no change 3.10 0.59
4: increase 8.54 5.89




1 1.8 1.3 1.9 0.6 0.1 5.7
2 3.5 8.3 16.8 3.2 0.6 32.4
3 1.7 5.5 34.2 7.3 1.6 50.2
4 0.4 0.8 3.5 5.0 1.5 11.2
5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.5




PREV84 1 0.368 4.61
PREV84 2 0.261 4.55
PREV84 4 -0.178 -2.12




LOG INC -0.021 -0.33

















log-likelihood −2832.5Table 7 : 95 % conﬁdence intervals for the probability of
overestimating and the probability of underestimating fu-
ture income changes as a function of PREV 84.
Employed man
Prob. of overestimating Prob. of underestimating
PREV 84 future income = Po future income = Pu T-value
lower upper lower upper
1 0.033 0.183 0.298 0.664 2.94
2 0.042 0.210 0.266 0.619 2.47
3 0.073 0.290 0.190 0.515 1.28
4 0.097 0.361 0.141 0.451 0.47
5 0.070 0.329 0.161 0.523 0.94
Disabled man
Prob. of overestimating Prob. of underestimating
PREV 84 future income = Po future income = Pu T-value
lower upper lower upper
1 0.059 0.273 0.204 0.558 1.54
2 0.072 0.311 0.174 0.516 1.08
3 0.115 0.408 0.116 0.413 0.02
4 0.149 0.485 0.082 0.352 0.68
5 0.111 0.449 0.096 0.419 0.14
See also note Table 3. The T-value represents the absolute value of the
T-statistic for the null-hypothesis that the probability of overestimating
equals the probability of underestimating, that is Po = Pu. The distri-
bution under the null is calculated with the use of the delta method.26





























Figure 1: Nonparametric regression of income expectation (INCEXP) on age
with 95% uniform conﬁdence bounds (dashed lines).27






























Figure 2: Nonparametric regression of income expectations (INCEXP) on
the logarithm of net income with 95% uniform conﬁdence bounds (dashed
lines).28






















Figure 3: Nonparametric regression of the diﬀerence between PREV 85 and
INCEXP on age with 95% uniform conﬁdence bounds (dashed lines).29



















Figure 4: Nonparametric regressioon of the diﬀerence between PREV 85
and INCEXP on the logarithm of net income with 95% uniform conﬁdence
bounds (dashed lines).